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Abstract 
Information technology has radically altered the management of supply chain operations; many business partners 
who are adjacent on the supply chain can gain from entering mter-organizational information sharzng (IOIS) 
relatlonshlps and sharing information that was previously accessible to only one of them. This situation is typical in 
retailer-supplier logistics management relationships. The first part of our study analyzes different forms of virtual 
integration - relationships between independent companies that result in some of their operations resembling those 
of a single vertically integrated firm - and classifies them based on their models of information sharing across the 
supply chain. We find that there are four primary policies that firms adopt when they exchange information across 
the supply chain; these are EDI, vendor managed inventory (VMI), continuous replenishment (CR) and category 
management (CM). 
Typically, corporations view the development of inter-organizational information systems, and the sharing of 
information as being targeted at increasing operational efficiency by reducing ordering costs, inventory costs and 
supply lead times. Many studies have focused on studying IOIS technology issues, and estimating the value 
generated from these arrangements using traditional models of inventory and ordering costs. However, we find that 
in a number of cases, the information shared can have cross-functional value - it can also be used to improve a 
supplier's production planning, and to alter their marketing and sales strategies. Paradoxically, however, suppliers 
who receive such information feel that not only are their benefits minimal, but they often end up worse ofthan 
before the IOIS was implemented. 
The second part of our study explains this paradox. We show how retailers and other buyers can successfully 
contract to end up with more value than is generated by the sharing of information. Using game-theoretic models of 
strategic interaction, we show that this effect intensifies as the competitive value of the information to the supplier's 
marketing and sales departments increases. Besides, as the value that could be generated by the sales and production 
divisions of the supplier increases, we demonstrate how the supplier loses more and more value. Furthermore, the 
buyer need not actually share the information to derive these rents; we indicate why the possibility of sharing is 
sufficient, even when the buyer cannot independently create value froin that information. 
The practical contributions of this inter-disciplinary study are manifold. We provide a clear and lucid description of 
the different levels at which organizations share information. We also describe a fairly general modeling framework 
which lays the foundation for a deeper analysis of this increasingly important area. Our strategic results demonstrate 
that a single focus on the technological or operational aspects of IOIS can mislead managers significantly. The true 
costs and benefits of these relationships can only be judged by recognizing the cross-functional impact of the 
information flows on the operational architecture, the marketing strategies of the suppliers and buyers, and the 
nature of competition within the respective organizations' industries. 
(Forthcoming in the Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on Information Systems, December 1997) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in information technology have enabled low-cost and efficient inter- 
organizational information sharing (101s) relationships between firms adjacent on the supply 
chain. These arrangements have been prevalent in the automotive industry for many years. For 
instance, Chrysler mandates that all its suppliers be able to interface electronically with their 
logistics management information systems. However, of late, IOIS arrangements have become 
more varied, and have also become common in a number of other industries; in particular, 
between large commercial retailers and their suppliers of OTC (over-the-counter) goods. 
We have studied several such arrangements. To illustrate some of the issues we believe are 
crucial to understanding their costs and benefits, consider the following real-life case: 
XYZ Corporation (the real name of the company has been withheld) started selling pharmaceutical over- 
the-counter (OTC) products in 1978. They have a variety of such products that they sell today. They rely 
heavily on electronic interfacing at various levels with their buyers in order to drive efficient supply chain 
management. 
XYZ was introduced to ED1 in 1985. Their basic ED1 process is fairly simple. Customers enter orders via 
ED1 by sending UPC codes and order quantities to an electronic mailbox with a specific customer ID. 
Orders are retrieved four times a day, and after being screened for consistency, are translated and sent into 
XYZ's order processing system. Currently, there are over 160 customers who use ED1 for ordering. 70% of 
their dollar volume of orders comes in electronically, and 50% of the total number of orders use this 
system. The benefits of the simple ED1 system have been immense. Delivery times have been cut from an 
average of 21 days to an average of 5 days. Customer order problems, which used to take 24 hours to 
handle, are resolved in less than an hour. The ED1 system is handled by customer service representatives, 
who, instead of entering line items manually, now have more time to focus on advertising, selling and 
forecasting. 
However, there are some concerns with this system. Customers like to use the same UPC each time they 
order, and do not keep up with changing product types and packaging sizes; hence, a fraction of the orders 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-97- 18 
tend to be for products that are no longer in existence. It is difficult to handle specialized product features, 
and promotional products, due to the information gap between the customer and XYZ. 
XYZ has solved these problems and achieved further operating improvements using VMI (vendor managed 
inventory). For instance, one of their retailers allows them to hook the ED1 system into the retailer's 
inventory system. This allows them to view POS data - XYZ controls the stock in the retailers stores. This 
eliminates the information gap discussed earlier. This information also has cross-functional value, as it 
allows XYZ to generate superior demand forecasts. It has increased the number of inventory turns by over 
300%. Another of XYZ's retailers does not allow this form of VMI, but gives XYZ access to their POS 
information; this information is targeted at helping XYZ's marketing and sales divisions make better 
forecasts, and to give XYZ the option of replenishing stocks continuously. XYZ also manages a whole 
category of OTC pharmaceutical products for one of their retailers; this provides XYZ with valuable 
information about competing pharmaceutical companies' sales and promotion patterns. 
The benefits to XYZ should be immense; however, their managers do not feel that there is any tangible net 
value from these advanced systems. The efficiency of their logistics management and their marketing 
strategies have improved; however, these benefits seem to be outweighed by the fact that they operate on 
stringent and expensive supply schedules, and are saddled with a number of the ordering costs that the 
retailer used to bear. In short, as one despondent manager put it: 'The retarler seems to huve extracted all 
the benefits of our partnership' 
The case raises a number of interesting points. We focus primarily on the following issues: 
How much information should a firm share? If sharing information generates value, one 
might argue, then why not share all relevant information available ? At least two 
observations are of consequence when examining the question of up to what level must one 
build these relationships: 
1 .  The sharing of information also affects a different dimension of the buyer-supplier 
relationship: the relative bargainingpower of the two parties. 
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2. The nature of the information shared may influence the strategies of departments outside 
operations and supply chain management; also, it may affect the competitive position of 
the buyer or supplier with respect to their own industry rivals. 
Based on our field studies, in $2 we describe the impact of different levels of information 
sharing on the operations, sales and marketing strategies of an organization. 
If these arrangements are indeed value creating, then a question which arises is how can IOlS 
relationships be sustained. For instance, a supplier may get tremendous operations and sales 
strategy improvements if permitted to access point-of-sales information; however, the buyer 
may not gain significantly from this arrangement. In a case like this, one would expect a 
contract of some kind to ensure that the information is shared on a continuous basis, and that 
the value created is shared in a satisfactory manner. In $3, we model the contracting process, 
and demonstrate that, though the supplier creates more value, the commonly observed buyer- 
takes-all outcome ofien emerges. 
We conclude in $4 by detailing a number of counter-intuitive strategic guidelines and managerial 
insights. 
Existing work in the area of inter-organizational information sharing has covered a fairly wide 
range of topics. The earliest articles which indicated the shape these sharing relationships may 
take were by Cash and Konsynski (1985), and Clemons and McFarlan (1986). The impact of 
ED1 on buyer-supplier reIationships has been studied by Wang and Seidmann (1995) and 
Riggins and Mukhopadhyay (1 994). Bensaou and Venkatraman (1 995) study interorganizational 
relationships in the U.S. and Japan, and develop and test a model based on the fit between 
information processing capabilities and needs. Clark and Stoddard (1996) discuss the cross 
functional value of ED1 and continuous replenishment arrangements in the grocery industry, and 
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discover, among other things, that inventory reductions occur for both buyer and suppliers. Their 
study is based primarily on four cases, descriptions of which can be found in Clark, Croson, 
McKenney and Nolan (1994), Clark and McKenney (1994), Clark and McKenney (1995) and 
Schiano and Clark (1995). Whang (1993) examines whether a seller should share queue 
information with a customer. The ability to share information across organizations creates a 
move towards more transactions with fewer suppliers, and this is explained in part in Clemons, 
Reddi and Row (1993). The impact of IT on co-ordination and bargaining power is studied by 
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993). An interesting case study of 101s can be found in Clemons and 
Row's 1988 study of the Economost system at McISesson Drug Company (this is a popular case 
in MBA courses for illustrating strategic information systems). In related work, Henderson 
(1990) studies the relationships between IS and line managers. One of his findings - that a 
critical determinant of partnership is mutual dependence 011 distinctive competencies and 
resources - is particularly relevant to the IOIS relationships we model. An interesting study of 
the impact of the potential incompleteness of contracts involving information assets is done by 
Brynjolfsson (I 994). 
2. THE LEVEL OF INFORMATION SHARING 
The diversity of information content, and the numerous sharing options makes it secmingly 
impossible to classify the nature or level of information sharing. Our field studies have indicated 
that a number of different sharing arrangements are possible. For example, some suppliers share 
inventory position information of the products a certain supplier sells them. This information 
may be transmitted daily, or weekly; the level of detail also varies. There are suppliers who see 
the store-level day-to-day point-ofsales (POS) information; there is a great deal of variety here 
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...' level of information 
level of buyer '.. 
Figure 1: Models of information sharing 
as well - some see only product UPC's and quantities, while others have access to temporal sales 
distribution and customer profiles. Other buyers transmit order quantity, payment and cost 
information using ED1 - this is a situation where the volume of information exchanged may be 
great, but its impact on the operations of the firms are relatively low. 
If one examines information from another perspective, the problem simplifies a great deal. We 
treat the level of information shared not based on what its exact content or volume is, but rather, 
based on the impact it has on the operations, sales, marketing and production strategies of the 
parties that contract to share the information. Using this view, one can classify IOIS 
arrangements into four categories, based on the level of impact the shared information has on the 
buyer and supplier (Figure 1). 
'l'he first level involves increased cost-and-time-effective exchange of transaction-level 
information (like order quantities and prices) through EDI. The second level involves sharing 
select operational information (such as inventory levels) in order to exploit superior expertise 
across organizational boundaries, and improve operating efficiency. At the third level, the 
information shared has strategic value to the party that receives the information. Finally, at the 
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Figure 2: ED1 -- exchanging transaction information 
highest level, the information adds both strategic and competitive value to the party that receives 
it. 
2.1 Exchanging order information 
Many IOIS arrangements do not involve sharing firm-specific operations information; they 
merely improve logistics processes through efficiency gains from EDI. We treat this case - where 
the companies exchange ordering information - as our base case. (Figure 2). This is one of the 
oldest and most widely prevalent forms of IOIS, and is aimed at reducing transactions costs and 
the duration of order cycles. 
At this level, both parties gain from reduced order cycle times (which reduce inventory levels). 
The value gained is not joint; each party improves efficiency independently, and hence there are 
no value sharing issues. There is the issue, however, of information technology costs. One party 
may find it cost-effective to invest in an ED1 system that enables these improvements; the other 
may not. However, both need to invest in the system in order to transact electronically. Prior 
studies have analyzed this situation (see, for instance, Wang and Seidmann, 1995) - subsidies are 
a common solution to this problem 
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Figure 3: VMI -- sharing operational information 
2.2 Sharing operations information 
information is often shared to leverage on the superior expertise, or operational economies-of- 
scale of one organization. This occurs when one firm owns valuable information, while the other 
firm possesses the ability to use this information. An example of this is vendor managed 
inventory (Figure 3). For instance, a buyer shares aggregate inventory position information with 
its suppliers; this enables suppliers to manage the inventory of their own products at the buyer's 
site. Suppliers are better equipped to perform these duties, for the following reasons: They have 
experience managing large supply side inventories of this product. They have superior 
knowledge of production schedules, which reduces the supply-side uncertainty that a buyer 
normally faces, resulting in a lower average inventory for the buyer. Thcy could have 
comparable VMI arrangements with a number of buyers (economies-of-scale). 
Efficiency gains are not restricted to inventory cost reductions. In our case in 51, when product 
specifications, packaging specifications or packaging quantities changed, an order sent with an 
outdated UPC would generate rework. M e n  new products were introduced, there was a similar 
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problem. Moving to VMI eliminated these difficulties. However, the buyer's costs of ordering 
and order fulfillment are now borne by the supplier. 
What does the supplier gain ? Their internal operating efficiency gains are minimal at best. 
However, one benefit that may not be immediately tangible (if it exists) is that the supplier's 
relative bargaining position for its transactions with the buyer may improve. Since it is has 
superior knowledge of how well or badly its product is doing on a regular basis, the information 
asymmetry it faces reduces; it may therefore be able to bargain for price schedules that are more 
favorable. 
It is likely that the contracts underlying these sharing agreements will include value sharing 
agreement between the buyer and the supplier. Alternately, there could be a penalty for non-VMI 
suppliers. This penalty could range from a complete shut-out ('we do business only with 
suppliers who manage their own inventories in our stores' - implies a strong bargaining position 
on the buyer side, despite the apparent gain in power by the supplier as described in the previous 
paragraph) to some kind of price advantage that the buyer passes on to the supplier. Our 
discussion in 93 provides insight into some these issues. 
2.3 Sharing strategic marketing information 
It is becoming common for organizations to share brand-specific information which provides 
strategic benefits to one of the organizations, and also leverages on their superior expertise. This 
occurs when one organization owns information that it can derive little independent value from, 
but which another can use to generate operational benefits for the company it receives the 
information from, besides garnering strategic value for its own sales and marketing departments, 
For instance, a retailer possesses POS (point-of-sales) information on all the products it sells. 
This information is not of much value in isolation; however, a supplier can make superior 
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Figure 4: Continuous Replenishment -- sharing strategic information 
demand forecasts by analyzing detailed transaction level information from many retailers. This 
form of information sharing is used in the efficient custolner response, continuous replenishment 
and quick response systems models (Figure 4), common in the grocery and fashion retailing 
industry. The model has been discussed for many years now - supply chain management has 
always striven to move towards a system where consumer purchases 'pull' goods through the 
chain, rather than suppliers 'pushing' them. Its scope has been widening over the last couple of 
years, extending to industries as diverse as brewing and forestry. For instance, after capacity 
gains of 5% at no extra cost from an ED1 system, Bass Brewers has recently started 
experimenting with a VMI system. 
Since inventory positions can easily be derived from POS information, the operational 
information that was the topic of $2.2 is also being shared. Hence, all the benefits that 
accompany VMI-type situations still exist. However, this information is of a much higher level 
of detail than inventory aggregates. - it can be used by the supplier's sales and product 
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Figure 5: Category management - sharing strategic and competitive marketing information 
development groups for improved demand forecasting, promotion scheduling and segment- 
specific forecasts. According to the director of worldwide sales forecasting at Eastman Kodak, 
such region specific and tactical demand forecasts are increasingly becoming a major role of 
sales (Chase, 1996). Reduced demand uncertainty also improve the internal inventory 
management of the supplier. The benefits described above may indicate that the buyer can 
induce suppliers unwilling to enter into information sharing agreements described in 52.2 by 
offering them access to information that is of strategic value. However, when this information is 
available to the supplier, the relative bargaining power of the buyer is reduced further. For 
instance, in the POS example above, the supplier now knows not only gross product movement 
figures, but also the details of what prices the buyer charges consumers, any local demand 
patterns and the schedule of promotions - this puts the buyer at a significant disadvantage when 
negotiating supply terms. 
2.4 Sharing strategic and competitive marketing and sales information 
At the highest level of information sharing, it is possible for a buyer to allow a supplier to access 
broad market information that provides the supplier with strategic and competitive benefits. This 
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Research 
occurs when one organization possesses information that it can derive little independent value 
from, but from which another can derive internal strategic production benefits, as well as 
competitive sales and marketing benefits (Figure 5). The competitive benefits are with respect to 
intra-industry rivals - this information does not give the supplier additional competitive 
advantage over the buyer, but over other suppliers in its own industry. Category management is 
an example of this situation. 
The retailer endows one of the suppliers with inventory management responsibility over all the 
products supplied for that category, and provides them with the relevant POS information. This 
gives that supplier strategic benefits (from improved demand forecasts), competitive benefits 
(from sales and demand information about competitor's products), and will enable superior 
inventory management. It also reduces the buyer's operating costs tremendously - not only are all 
order management costs eliminated, but the buyer deals with only one supplier per category, and 
hence has a significant reduction in information technology costs. 
On the face of it, the supplier also gains tremendously when provided access to this information. 
Not only are all the benefits of 52.3 present, but the supplier can track the sales of competing 
products in the category, and use this information to improve the sales strategy of their own 
product. Since there may be a time lag between the category manager generating an order, and a 
competing supplies receiving it, inventory costs of competing products will tend to be highcr, 
and hence the category manager gains a cost advantage as well. The tradeoff appears to be 
increased transaction costs for the supplier, who manages, orders and monitors product 
movements of a whole category of products. 
In this section, we have discussed the sources of value creation when two companies share 
information at different levels. In $3, we examine how this value will be shared by the two firms. 
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3. COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF VALUE SHARING: WHY THE 'BUYER TAKES ALL' 
We model a market with one buyer (B) and two competing suppliers (S1 and S2). Each supplier k 
manufactures one product, called product k. We examine three situations - no information 
sharing, VMI with POS data transfer (continuous replenishment), and category management. 
3.1 General Framework for Analyzing Value Sharing 
As discussed in detail in $2, the value from information sharing is generated by the following 
factors: 
1 .  Operational savings for the buyer: If the buyer shares demand information (POS) about 
product k with supplier k then this results in cost savings of ik for the buyer. These are the 
savings from reduced inventory and ordering costs described in $2.2 and $2.3 (See ch.4 and 5 
of Nahmias, 1996, or Linwood and Montgomery, 1974, for more discussion on inventory 
costs) 
2. Strategic sales and marketing revenue for the supplier: If supplier k has exclusive access to 
demand information about product k, then the supplier gains an amount sk (as described in 
$2.3). If both suppliers have access to their respective demand information, then they both 
gain qsk. q lies between 0 and 1, and represents the competitive environment; q close to zero 
implies a highly competitive supplier market, and q close to 1 implies a very low degree of 
competition between suppliers. The remaining gains of (I-q)sk per product arc captured by 
the consumers. 
3. Competitive marketing revenue for the suppliers: If supplier k has access to both its own 
demand information, and to that of supplier j, then supplier k gains competitive value of ck, 
and supplierj loses an equal amount (these are the competitive revenues described in $2.4). 
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Table 1: Payoffs under different sharing arrangements 
Strictly, this is not value creation, as it is a zero sum situation; however, if B and Sk contract, 
they are jointly better off by this amount (even though Sj loses, it still represents value addition 
for B and Sk). See chapter 9 of Lilien, Kotler and Moorthy (1992) for further details of the 
competitive aspects of distribution, or any standard ~nicroeconomics text (for instance, 
MasColell, Whinston and Green, ch.10) for a discussion of competition in an oligopoly. There 
are also the following transfers made, depending on the nature of the information exchanged: 
1. Bargaining power transfers: If supplier k has access to their own demand information, 
then the buyer loses b k  - this reflects their loss in bargaining power (as described in $2.2 - $2.4). 
Supplier k gains this amount hk. 
2. Contractualpayrnents: When B contracts with Sk, there is a transfer payment of pk from ' 
Sk to B. This could be a dollar payment, or a reflection of one of the parties bearing 
administrative costs that the other used to bear. pk can be negative. 
Now, there are six possible situations: 
1. No information exchange 
2. VMI between B and S 1 
'I 
3.  VMI between B and S2 
4. VMI with both S1 and S2 
1 z 
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5.  S1 as category manager 
6. S2 as category manager 
The costs and benefits to each party under each arrangement, along with the net value created are 
summarized in Table 1. 
This is our general framework. The analytical scope of this particular paper restricts us to 
assuming that the suppliers are identical i.e. i,= iz = i, cl = cl = c, and so on. 
3.2 Inducing one supplier to be a category manager 
We first examine the case in which the buyer wishes to make one of their suppliers a category 
manager. The value that is generated from this arrangement is s+i+c. In the absence of 
competition, one would expect them to share this value equally (that is the predicted Nash 
bargaining outcome; see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, Chapter 22). It is achieved through a 
payment o f p  = b+ O.S(s+c-i) from the supplier to the buyer. 
However, the buyer has two competing suppliers, and can potentially get more value from the 
supplier through creative contracting. Let the payment from the chosen supplier to B be denoted 
pc,. The following result follows: 
Proposition 1: The transfer payment per is strictly less than the sum of the gain in bargaining 
power, potential gain in strategic value and twice the potential gain in competitive value, i.e., pc-1 
<b+s+2c 
(All analytical proofs and extensive forms of the subsequent contracting games are in our 
technical appendix) 
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Proposition 1 follows from the fact that any payment which is greater than or equal to b+s+2c 
will leave the supplier with a residual value less than -c The supplier can do better by not 
contracting; hence, a contract not satisfying this condition will definitely be rejected. 
Interestingly, however, the buyer can negotiate a payment very close to this bound. Consider the 
following sequence of events: 
1. The buyer offers one of the suppliers a category management contract for a payment ofpcl. 
2. If the contract is accepted, then the negotiation ends. If not, the buyer offers the other 
supplier a category management contract for a payment ofpc2. The other supplier either accepts 
or rejects the contract. 
The following result shows that the buyer can end up with more than the value created by the 
information sharing transaction: 
Proposition 2: lfpcl <b+s+ 2c, andpc2 b+s+c, then there are two equivalent rational outcomes 
of the contracting game described: 
1. B offers SI  category management at pel and SI accepts the offer 
2. B offers St, category management atpcl and S2 accepts the offer. 
(By rational outcomes, we mean subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE); the reader is referred 
to any text on game theory --for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, ch. 3.5 --for a discussion 
of this equilibrium concept). 
Intuitively, the result follows from the fact that if the value of the payment pel satisfies the first 
inequality, the first supplier (say, Sk) has to accept the terms of the contract (payment of pel); not 
accepting them will make that supplier worse off (when the other supplier Sj accepts 
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subsequently). The second inequality ensures that the threat of the buyer to offer the second 
supplier the contract at pcz is credible 
This result shows that the buyer can not only extract all the value created from the supplier, but 
also an additional amount almost equal to the competitive value generated for a supplier from 
gaining access to the information. In a sense, the supplier gets all the inventory savings, all the 
strategic value generated by S1, loses no bargaining power, and extracts the competitive value of 
the information from both the suppliers! 
We state a simple follow-up proposition; it follows from Propositions 1 and 2. 
Proposition 3: It is possible for the buyer to get any total value that is strictly less than, but very 
close to, s+2c+i. However, the buyer can never get a total value greater than (s+2c+i). 
This proposition indicates the maximum value a buyer can get from a category management 
arrangement; as mentioned earlier, this is more than the actual value created (which is s+c+i) 
from the information sharing arrangement. 
3.3 Inducing both suppliers to manage their inventory 
We now model to a situation where the buyer wants both suppliers to manage their own 
inventories. At first glance, the nature of the desired outcome (that both suppliers independently 
contract with the buyer) leads one to believe that there will be genuine value sharing in this case, 
and the buyer will not end up extracting everything from the suppliers. However, this is not the 
case in practice, and the next result shows why. 
Consider the following sequence of offers. All payments are from supplier to buyer. 
Stage 1: The buyer offers both suppliers individual VMI contracts at a payment ofpl= pr=pr 
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VMI (R - S2) 0 
Table 2: Payoffs to each firm under each outcome 
Stage 2: If both accept the contract, then the issue is settled. Otherwise: 
If one of them has accepted, the buyer offers tliat supplier a category management 
contract for a total payment o fpc I .  
If neither of them has accepted, the buyer randomly offers one of them a category 
management contract for a payment ofpc2 
The final value for each party under the different possible outcomes are summarized in Table 2. 
The next proposition characterizes the values of the transfer payments that the buyer must offer 
which ensure that the unique rational outcome (SPNE)  of the contracting game is both suppliers 
accepting VMI, at rather unfavorable terms to themselves. 
Proposition 4: Ifthe follo~iing conditions are satisfied: 
1. p r <  s+b+c 
2. pr: <pel < c+min@~ 0.5(s+b+pc2)) 
then every rational outcome of the sequence of offers above must include both SI  and S2 
accepting VMI. Therefore, every rational outcome yields the following payoffs to the three firms: 
B: 2i-2b+2pV 
SI:  qs+b-pv 
Sz: qs+b-pv 
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The first condition ensures that the suppliers participate in the arrangement (i.e., that they are 
better off by participating than by refusing to). The second condition ensures that the threat of 
offering category management (if one of the suppliers chooses not to participate in VMI) is 
credible i.e., it is beneficial for both the buyer and supplier at that stage of the contracting 
process. 
A result similar to Proposition 3 is now stated. 
Proposition 5: It is possible for the buyer to get any total value that is strictly less than, but very 
close to, 2qs+2c+2i by inducing both suppliers to adopt VMI. However, the bzyer can never get 
a total value greater than (2qs+2c+2i). 
Again, we note the phenomenon of the buyer gaining more than the value created (2qs+2i) from 
the sharing arrangement. Now, Propositions 3 and 5 have indicated how high the value extraction 
of the buyer can go in each of the two situations. Any rational buyer faced with these clioices 
goes for the better option: 
Proposition 6: I f q  > 0.5(1 - i/s), then the buyer prefers VMI; i f q  < 0.5(1 - i/s), the buyer prefers 
category management; f q  = 0.5(1 - iL9, the buyer is indfferent. 
Since we know the maximum feasible payoff to the buyer in each game (from Propositions 3 
and 5 ) ,  comparing these figures yields the result. The first implication is that ceteris paribus, as 
the level of competition in the supplier market increases, the buyer is more likely to prefer 
category management. Also, as the level of strategic value that the supplier can generate 
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increases, category management becomes more likely. Finally, as the level of inventory savings 
for the buyer increases, VMI becomes more likely. 
Note that the magnitude of competitive rent c is not a part of the decision; this is because the 
buyer can extract this in either case. However, it is a crucial determinant of whether a buyer will 
want an IOIS at all - as c increases, the benefits to the buyer increase. 
The modeling framework in 53.1 allows for a much deeper analysis of other situations as well 
(imbalance in size, asymmetric information) that are unfortunately beyond the scope of this 
paper. We defer the description of this analysis to a forthcoming, more detailed research paper. 
4. SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS 
Corporations have long been aware of how information systems can allow thern to operate across 
organizational boundaries; however, there has not been much research into the competitive 
implications of these IOIS arrangements. There has also been significant concern on the past of 
suppliers who see no tangible benefits accruing to thern from different information sharing 
arrangements. Our study offers the following insights into these long-standing concerns. 
1. The impact of IOIS relationships is not merely operational; they can alter supplier marketing 
and sales strategies, and shape competition in supplier markets. 
2. It is possible for a buyer to extract all the competitive value of information from each 
supplier. Therefore, it is worthwhile for buyers to collect as much information as possible 
that is of competitive value to their suppliers - they need not actually share it - a realistic 
threat of potential sharing is sufficient. 
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3. In a supplier market with many competing suppliers of similar size, VMI is likely to be the 
best policy for a buyer; though category management may offer higher operational savings, a 
buyer can do better by extracting competitive value from the suppliers with the threat of CM. 
4. The following increase the operational savings that a supplier expects from 101s relationship: 
High inventory cost rates 
High demand uncertainty 
However, the supplier sliould examine the competitive factors involved in these 
arrangements, before being tempted by large (and often illusory) cost savings, as tlie buyer 
could end up getting all the value from the arrangements. 
5. Buyers should target suppliers who have the characteristics described in (4), as they are 
likely to be tempted by the prospects of high savings - since these savings are likely to 
accrue to the buyer, these are better firms to share illformation with. The same holds for 
highly competitive supplier markets. 
6. Partnering with suppliers (as advocated by many supply chain management information 
systems vendors) is unlikely to be optimal for the buyer in many situations. There is little 
reason for buyers to be worried about loss in bargaining power when they share information; 
through creative contracting, they can regain any power they apparently lose. 
7. A supplier in an IOIS relatioilship is often uiilikely to benefit from the relationship, or accrue 
any of the value generated; however, it may still be necessary to remain in the arrangement, 
to avoid further losses. A supplier who breaks even on a VMI or category management 
agreement is probably doing as well as they can. 
8. As I.T. enables buyers to use and share information more effectively, they are bound to be 
able to 'pull' more and more from suppliers. Hence, suppliers may do well to negotiate loiig- 
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term VMI contracts with buyers. Even if these contracts generate little or no apparent present 
or future value, they are insurance against what will only become a less favorable market for 
them. This is particularly true in highly competitive markets; if a buyer possesses competitive 
marketing or sales information that is potentially very valuable to a supplier, this is not a sign 
of the supplier beneJiting a lot, but a predictor of all suppliers losing a lot. 
9. As the cost of processing and sharing information drops, as is evidently has and will continue 
to do (Moore's Law, Gilder's Law), two related occurrences are very likely: 
The volume of information that a buyer collects (and can potentially share) will increase 
The strategic and competitive value of this information to suppliers will increase 
In the light of our analysis, this spells more profits for the buyer, and more value extraction 
from suppliers. 
Our results may appear to be prophecies of doom for suppliers; however, rather than remaining 
in denial, they need to understand the nature of their relationships, and try to organize them as 
favorably as they can. Our ongoing studies are aimed at modeling precisely the effect of 
technology and competition on contracting in a heterogeneous supplier market. We are also 
investigating the issue of asymmetric information about the value of the information, and the 
potential incompleteness that the contracts over information shared could have. 
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A. TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Without loss in generality (as our suppliers are symmetric), supplier 1 is the category manager. 
By choosing to be the category manager, the net gain for the supplier is -pcl+b+s+c. If, on the 
other hand, the supplier had chosen not to be a category manager, in the worst case, their net 
gains are -c (in the case that supplier 2 becomes the category manager). Supplier 1 is rational, 
and hence should be better off by choosing to be the category manager i.e., 
-pcl+b+s+c > -C 
Rearranging the terms, we get 
pc, < b+st2c 
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0 I-~+P,, 0 I-b+Pc, 
0 b+s+c-p ., 0 -c 
0 -C 0 ~+s+c-p  ,, 
Figure 6: Extensive form of contracting game that induces category management 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
The extensive form of the contracting game described in 3.1 is shown in Figure 6. Consider the 
bottom left subgame, where S1 has to decide whether to accept B's offer. Ifpcz < b+s+c, this 
implies that S2's payoff from accepting is strictly positive. Hence the rational action at this node 
is for S1 to accept. Now consider the node above that, where B decides whether to stop, or offer 
S1 the category management contract. Since B knows S1 will accept, B's only rational action is 
to offer S1 the contract. (Note that this is whypcz has to be less than b+s+c -to make the threat 
credible). Proceeding up one more node, to where S2 must decide whether to accept or reject the 
CM contract for a payment of pel. If Sl refuses, the outcome will be that S2 accepts later (as 
discussed,) and hence Sl's final payoff will be -c. If S1 accepts, the payoff to S1 is b+s+c-pel, 
which is strictly greater than -c. Hence, the only sequentially rational move for St  is to accept 
the contract, so long as pel <s+b+Zc. This shows that (B offers S1 CM at pc,, S1 accepts) is an 
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SPNE. The game is symmetric; the same sequence of arguments will show that the other set of 
strategies is also SPN. 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Denote the net gain for the buyer from a category management arrangement as n. 
Now, n = i - b). However, from Proposition 1, 
pel _<b+s+2c 
=>n+b-i _< b+s+2c 
=>n 5 s+2c+I 
Therefore, a buyer can never get total value greater than s+2c+i. 
Consider any pcl=b+s+2c-~ s >O. So long as pcz > b+s+c, the buyer can induce category 
management with this payment, for any P O  (this follows from Proposition 2). Hence, the buyer 
can get a total value of 
n = (b+s+2c-d+ i- b 
= s+2c+I-E for all s >O. 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
The extensive form of the game described in 3.2 is shown in Figure 7. The actions at each node 
that form a part of the precise description of one such SPNE outcome are listed below: 
Node 1 : S1 accepts VMI 
Node 2,3: Sz accepts VM 
Node 4: B offers S l CM 
Node 5: B offers S1 CM with 0.5 probability, B offers S2 CM with 0.5 probability 
Node 6: B offers S2 CM 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-97- 18 
i-b i-b+kl 0 i-b+k, 0 i-b+pc2 i-b i-b+pcl 
s+b-h s+b+c-k1 0 s+b+c-k2 0 -C 0 -C 
0 -c 0 -c 0 s+b+c-k2 s+b-p,, s+b+c-k1 
Figure 7: Extensive form of contracting game that induces VMI 
Node 7,8 : S1 accepts (A) 
Node 9,lO: S2 accepts (A) 
The outcomes at nodes (7) through (10) are a consequence of condition 2. Once it is ensured that 
these are the only Nash outcomes at these nodes, the actions at (4) and (6) follow. Any pure or 
mixed strategy is optimal at node (5) ;  however, a little thought will show that if any other mixed 
strategy forms part of an SPNE, then replacing that with the symmetric mixed strategy will not 
alter sub-game perfection. The strategy at this node determines the expected payoffs if both S1 
and S2 refuse, and is critical to the credibility of the threat. Finally, condition (1) ensures that the 
actions described at nodes 1,2 and 3 are sequentially rational. 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
Similar to Proposition 2; follows directly from Proposition 4. 
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Proof of Proposition 6: 
From Proposition 3, the maximum equilibrium payoff to the buyer under category management 
is C = (s+2c+i) (this is when the supplier is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the 
contract). Similarly, from Proposition 5 ,  the maximum equilibrium payoff for the buyer under 
VMI is V =  (2qs+2c+2i). First, let us consider the case that q>O.5(1-Us). This implies that: 
This leads the buyer to prefer VMI. The equality and < cases follow in the same fashion. 
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